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Abstract
Using samples from 12 non-U.S.A. countries, we ﬁnd that following Arthur Andersen’s
failure in the United States of America, successor Big-N auditors charged an audit fee
premium for ex-Andersen clients compared to existing clients and non-Andersen
switch-ins. We show that this audit fee premium is not attributable to the Andersen
switch-ins having lower prior earnings quality or lower bargaining power than non-
Andersen switch-ins. We also show that ex-Andersen clients exhibit higher earnings
quality after the switch than do ongoing clients and other switch-ins. These results sug-
gest that the audit fee premium is attributable to auditor conservatism. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that risk assessments for ex-Andersen clients are higher in countries with weak
legal and extra-legal institutions. We interpret this result as suggesting that the eﬀect of
lost auditor reputation is stronger when objective evidence of earnings quality is uncer-
tain because of weaker supporting institutions. This is the ﬁrst study to document a
direct eﬀect of countrywide institutions on audit risk assessment.
1. Introduction
We show in this paper that subsequent to the demise of Arthur Ander-
sen (Andersen), non-U.S.A. international ex-Andersen clients were
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charged higher audit fees and were held to more conservative standards
by their new auditors than were their other ongoing and switch-in
clients.1 This ﬁnding suggests that although the Andersen audit failure
was conﬁned to its U.S.A. arm, its impact also extended to the ﬁrm’s
international clients. We ﬁnd that the incremental audit risk new audi-
tors assessed for international ex-Andersen clients is similar to that
attributed to ex-Andersen clients in the United States of America, as doc-
umented by Cahan and Zhang (2006) and Kealey et al. (2007). Further-
more, we ﬁnd that country-level diﬀerences in legal and extra-legal
institutions aﬀected risk assessments made by auditors. In particular, ex-
Anderson clients were assessed as higher risk and were treated more con-
servatively in countries with weaker legal and extra-legal institutions. To
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to document the eﬀect of
countrywide legal and extra-legal institutions on audit risk assessment.
The conservative treatment of ex-Andersen clients outside the United
States of America indicates that reputational loss in the United States of
America spills over to other countries. This reputational transfer can also be
seen in the negative stock price response to the Andersen failure among
non-U.S.A. clients (Cahan et al., 2009). These ﬁndings suggest that the
audit risk assessed by successor auditors of ex-Andersen clients consists of
two components: the normal audit risk component based on earnings report
quality that is common to all ongoing and switch-in clients, and the incre-
mental audit risk component attributable to Andersen’s loss of reputation.
Auditors’ assessment of audit risk is not directly observable. How-
ever, an increased audit risk assessment results in greater audit eﬀort
and higher audit fees (Simunic, 1980). Our results on higher audit fees
for ex-Andersen clients are consistent with the aforementioned reputa-
tional transfer argument. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the earnings quality
of ex-Andersen clients is higher than that of other switch-ins and ongo-
ing clients in the post-demise period, thus adding further evidence of
auditor conservatism and more intense auditing by new auditors.
Higher audit fees could also reﬂect auditors extracting rent from cli-
ents with weak bargaining power. Our evidence shows that the fee pre-
mium paid by ex-Andersen clients is not attributable to their lower
bargaining strength. We determine the diﬀerential bargaining power of
ex-Andersen clients using March 2002 (when Andersen was indicted) as
the cutoﬀ date. Clients who switched before the indictment are presumed
to have had more options than those forced to switch afterward.2
Our study shows that the audit fee premium for ex-Andersen clients
is higher in countries with weaker legal and extra-legal institutions3.
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This result indicates that the normal audit risk component attributable
to prior earnings quality is higher in countries with strong legal and
extra-legal institutions, perhaps because evidence of earnings quality is
objective and defensible. However, in countries where legal and extra-
legal institutions are weak, earnings quality and other objective data
are less reliable for the purpose of assessing audit risk. Correspond-
ingly, the reputational loss eﬀect becomes more important.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. It is the ﬁrst
investigation conducted in an international setting to explicitly examine
the eﬀect of Andersen’s demise on earnings quality and audit pricing. It
also complements a large body of research examining the eﬀects of
Andersen’s demise on securities markets, audit fees, and ﬁnancial
reporting quality in the United States of America (e.g., Chaney and
Philipich, 2002; Asthana et al., 2004; Krishnan, 2005; Cahan and
Zhang, 2006; Krishnamurthy et al., 2006; Kealey et al., 2007; Kohlbeck
et al., 2008; Nelson et al., 2008). Our ﬁnding that the fees and switch-in
premiums new auditors charged international ex-Andersen clients were
higher than justiﬁed by objective earnings quality evidence is also new
to the literature. Neither do studies examining related issues mirror our
ﬁnding that auditors’ risk assessments were partly determined by legal
and extra-legal institutions (Khurana and Raman, 2004; Choi and
Wong, 2007; Choi et al., 2008; Francis and Wang, 2008).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section
provides a brief review of the literature before developing the hypothe-
ses. The third section discusses the models employed, the research
design, the analyses conducted, and the results. The fourth section sets
out additional analyses. We provide our conclusions in the ﬁfth section.
2. Background and Hypotheses
In their study of the eﬀect of Andersen’s demise on the audit fees of
Andersen’s U.S.A. clients, Kohlbeck et al. (2008) ﬁnd low-balling for
clients who switched in the open market, but not for those who moved
with the acquired Andersen oﬃces. Using a similar sample of former
Andersen clients in the U.S.A. market, Kealey et al. (2007) ﬁnd that
the audit fees charged by successor auditors were positively associated
with the length of the prior auditor’s tenure. Their results suggest that
successor auditors perceived new clients with a longer history with
Andersen as posing a higher level of risk. Cahan and Zhang (2006)
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in unadjusted and performance-adjusted
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abnormal accruals between U.S.A. clients of Andersen and those of
other Big-N auditors.4 Likewise, using the frequency of ﬁnancial
restatements as a measure of audit quality, Eisenberg and Macey
(2003) fail to ﬁnd any diﬀerence between Andersen clients and the cli-
ents of other Big-N auditors. Only the clients of Andersen’s Houston
oﬃce show evidence of more earnings management relative to clients
of other Big-N auditors (Krishnan and Visvanatham, 2008). Although
our investigation reﬂects the results of U.S.A. studies in not yielding
evidence of earnings quality diﬀerences between Andersen clients and
the clients of other Big-N auditors, our study contrasts with U.S.A.
studies in ﬁnding that Andersen clients were held to more conservative
standards and were charged higher audit fees.
Another stream of literature examining the market reaction to the
demise of Andersen provides mixed results. Chaney and Philipich
(2002) document negative abnormal returns during four Enron-Ander-
sen-related events, but Nelson et al. (2008) show that these results are
confounded by unrelated concurrent events. Krishnamurthy et al.
(2006) show that Andersen clients exhibit negative returns around the
time Andersen was indicted.
2.1. Audit Fee Premium for Ex-Andersen Clients: The Risk
Hypothesis
The fee premium for ex-Andersen clients has two components: the nor-
mal switch-in risk premium applicable to all switch-in clients that is
attributable to earnings quality, and the reputational loss switch-in
premium applicable only to ex-Andersen clients. The normal switch-in
premium is measured by the diﬀerence in audit fees between ﬁrms that
switched in from other Big-N ﬁrms and existing clients (after control-
ling for other determinants). The additional reputational loss premium
is measured by the audit fee diﬀerence between ex-Andersen clients
and clients that switched in from other Big-N auditors.
The additional switch-in premium for Andersen clients could also
reﬂect rents extracted by succeeding Big-N auditors due to the lower bar-
gaining power of ex-Andersen clients forced to switch. We test the bar-
gaining power hypothesis by diﬀerentiating between ex-Andersen clients
based on the time they switched to new auditors. All clients that switched
before the date Andersen was indicted (March 2002) are categorized as
early switchers with greater bargaining power. This classiﬁcation is con-
sistent with the approach taken by Kohlbeck et al. (2008), who classify
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those who switched before April 15, 2002 (when the ﬁrst Andersen oﬃce
was sold) as early switchers. We categorize post-March 2002 switchers as
late switchers with lower bargaining power. We include in the sample of
late switchers clients who switched after March 2002, but before the rele-
vant Andersen oﬃce was formally acquired or closed (the “lead period”).
The rationale behind their inclusion is that after Andersen was indicted,
the bargaining power of the ﬁrm’s clients fell irrespective of whether they
switched during the lead period or after the Andersen oﬃce was acquired
by another auditor. Our late switchers include both clients who stayed
with the Andersen practice acquired by a competing auditor and clients
who chose to move to a diﬀerent auditor after the practice was sold. The
diﬀerence in ex-Andersen premiums between early and late switchers
reﬂects the bargaining power premium, if any.
We employ a two-stage empirical approach to distinguish between
three types of Andersen premiums with distinct drivers: a normal
switch-in premium, a reputational loss premium, and a low bargaining
strength premium. In the ﬁrst stage, we hypothesize and ﬁnd that ex-
Andersen clients paid an audit fee premium over and above the nor-
mal switch-in premium. In the second stage, we test and conﬁrm the
prediction that this premium was not driven by the client’s lower bar-
gaining power. Taken together, these results indicate the existence of a
reputational loss premium. Auditor conservatism related to Andersen’s
reputational loss provides the best explanation for such a premium.
We formally state the risk hypothesis as follows:
H1: Risk hypothesis:
H1.1: Excess audit fee for ex-Andersen clients:
H1.1.1: The mean abnormal audit fee for ex-Andersen clients is higher than
that for non-Andersen switch-in clients.
H1.1.2: The mean abnormal audit fee for ex-Andersen clients is higher than
that for existing clients of the remaining Big-N auditors.
H1.2 Non-attribution to bargaining power: There is no diﬀerence in the
excess mean abnormal audit fees charged to early and late-switching
ex-Andersen clients with diﬀerent levels of bargaining power.
H1.3: Non-attribution to actual diﬀerence in quality: The accruals quality of
ex-Andersen clients is no lower than the accruals quality of other Big-N audi-
tors’ clients either before or afterAndersen’s demise.
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2.2. Eﬀects of Countrywide Legal and Extra-Legal Institutions
2.2.1. Eﬀect on average audit fee. Previous studies indicate that investor
protection laws and their enforcement inﬂuence corporate governance,
ownership, and capital structures across countries (e.g., La Porta
et al., 1997, 1998). La Porta et al. (1998) developed the rule of law
index and gauge the eﬃciency of judicial systems to measure the
strength of country-level legal institutions. Shareholders in countries
with strong legal and extra-legal institutions rely on accounting and
audit infrastructure to exercise their ownership rights. Investor reliance
on audit assurance increases the degree of responsibility and litigation
risk among auditors (Khurana and Raman, 2004). Auditors respond
to higher risk by exerting more eﬀort, which itself is reﬂected in higher
fees.
Haw et al. (2004) show that extra-legal institutions such as competi-
tion laws, press coverage, and tax compliance reduce expropriation by
insiders. Strong competition laws lower the threshold for litigation
against rent-seeking ﬁrms. Press coverage sheds light on misdeeds and
thereby increases litigation and reputational losses. To maintain their
reputation, ﬁrms signal that they are “clean” by engaging high-quality
auditors. These arguments suggest a positive association between audit
fees and the country’s legal and extra-legal institutions (Ball et al.,
2000, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Gul, 2006). However, strong
legal and extra-legal institutions also reduce the private beneﬁts of
insiders (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Haw et al., 2004), which in turn
reduce their incentive to manage earnings (Leuz et al., 2003). Gul et al.
(2003) ﬁnd a positive association between discretionary accruals and
audit fees, suggesting that ceteris paribus, lower earnings management
should result in lower audit fees. It is therefore an empirical question
as to which of these two eﬀects prevails.
2.2.2. Eﬀect on the Andersen client premium. In countries with strong
legal and extra-legal institutions, objective evidence such as the mea-
sured quality of the client’s earnings is reliable, and can form the basis
of auditors’ risk assessments. However, in countries with weak institu-
tions, where less objective evidence is available,5 the reputational loss
eﬀect due to the demise of Andersen becomes more important. Ceteris
paribus, in these countries, perceived audit risk is likely to be higher
for ex-Andersen clients than for clients of other Big-N auditors.
Accordingly, we hypothesize a negative association between the
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premium for ex-Andersen clients and the strength of legal and extra-
legal institutions.
In eﬀect, greater audit risk for comparable earnings quality in coun-
tries with weak legal and extra-legal institutions suggests that auditing
eﬀort and the country’s institutional strengths are substitutes. Similar
substitution arguments have been made in diﬀerent but related set-
tings. Durnev and Kim (2005) show that at the ﬁrm level, greater vol-
untary disclosure, an independent board, and the voluntary adoption
of mechanisms to prevent expropriation can compensate for the eﬀect
of weak legal institutions. Fan and Wong (2005) show that auditing
substitutes for governance in East Asian countries. Choi and Wong
(2007) ﬁnd that Big-N auditors play stronger governance roles in weak
legal environments. Kwon et al. (2007) show that earnings quality is
higher for ﬁrms with industry-specialist auditors, and that this eﬀect is
stronger in weak legal environments. Srinidhi et al. (2009) ﬁnd evi-
dence of a lower specialist auditor fee premium in countries with stron-
ger legal, extra-legal, and political institutions.
In contrast to the substitution argument, Francis and Wang (2008)
show that Big-N auditors are more sensitive to client misreporting
and consequent reputational loss than are other auditors, and that
they, therefore, require higher earnings quality among clients they
perceive to be more risky when investor protection regimes are stron-
ger. There is also evidence of a positive association between ﬁrm-level
transparency and audit quality (Clarkson et al., 2003; Danielsen
et al., 2007). The foregoing arguments are formally presented in the
following non-directional null hypothesis on the association of legal
and extra-legal systems and the audit fee premium for ex-Andersen
clients.
H2: Auditor Conservatism Hypothesis: There is no association between legal
and extra-legal variables and the audit fee premium for ex-Andersen clients.
3. Data, Models, and Results
3.1. Sample
Our sample includes countries outside North America that provide fee
information in the Global Vantage database. Of the 13 countries with
at least 250 ﬁrm-years of fee and ﬁnancial data during the sample per-
iod from 1999 to 2004,6 we exclude China because of the unavailability
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of data on the legal institutional strength variable. Our ﬁnal sample
consists of 19,046 ﬁrm-year observations from 12 countries and
regions: Australia, Denmark, France, Hong Kong, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. Audit fee disclosures are mandatory in most of the
sample countries (Kallunki et al., 2007; Taylor and Simon, 1999).
The largest sample of observations is from the United Kingdom
(30.62%, 5,831 ﬁrm-year observations) and the smallest is from Spain
(1.57%, 299 ﬁrm-year observations). The variation in sample size across
countries is driven by data availability. The sample size does not vary
much over the years (from 15.35% in 2001 to 17.85% in 2003). The var-
iation across industries ranges from 1.84% (351 ﬁrms) in pharmaceuti-
cals to 21% (3,982 ﬁrms) in durable goods manufacturing.
Unsurprisingly, cross-tabulation between countries and industries
(untabulated) reveals a greater preponderance of mining in resource-
based countries such as Australia and a greater preponderance of retail
in trading countries and regions such as Hong Kong and Singapore. In
an additional analysis, we construct a reduced sample of 12,810 ﬁrm-
year observations that excludes the “dirty period” of 2001–2002 from
the full sample to ensure that our results are not driven by instability in
the period surrounding the demise of Andersen and the downfall of En-
ron and WorldCom. Panels A and B of Table 1 provide the distribution
of ﬁrms (individually) by year, country, and industry for the full sample.
We deﬁne our variables in Exhibit 1. Panel A of Table 2 lists the
countrywide legal and extra-legal variables for each country. We use
two legal variables developed by La Porta et al. (1998): the rule of law
index (RULE), and the eﬃciency of the judicial system (EFF). These
two variables capture the legal tradition and the eﬃciency of enforce-
ment. The extra-legal institution measures are extracted from the study
of Dyck and Zingales (2004), and include product competition
(COMP), the per capita circulation of daily newspapers (NEWS), and
the rate of tax compliance (TAX). We include U.S.A. data in the last
row for comparison. Of the 12 sample countries, Australia and some
European countries have high legal and extra-legal variable scores,
whereas Malaysia and South Africa have lower scores. This clustering
suggests strong correlations between the treatment variables, with
countries with good (poor) scores representing more (less) informative
reporting environments. Panel B also lists other countrywide institu-
tional variables: LCIFAR, which measures disclosure quality in each
country; SMDEV, which measures stock market development in the
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country concerned; AUDRISK, the litigation index employed by
Wingate (1997) to proxy for litigation risk faced by auditors;
OWNCON, which measures the ownership pattern of ﬁrms in various
countries (La Porta et al., 1997); and ANACOV, a proxy for the
extent of analyst coverage in each country (Kini et al., 2003). Exhibit
1 provides detailed deﬁnitions for these variables. Panel B of Table 2
gives the mean values of audit fees and other ﬁrm-level variables for
each country. Consistent with our expectations, audit fees in Europe
and the United Kingdom are higher than in Malaysia and Singapore.
Inventory and receivables constitute 30–35% of total assets in all
countries, ranging from 24% in Australia to 40% in France. Big-N
auditors audit about 85% of all clients, although this proportion varies
from 40% in France to 95% in Spain. Ex-Andersen clients constitute
only 4% of clients in France, but represent 33% of all clients in Spain.
We report the Pearson correlations for the country-speciﬁc institu-
tional variables in Panel C. As expected, the correlations for some
institutional variables are high, an issue commonly encountered in
cross-country research. We address this problem by analyzing the
impacts of each institution one at a time. We report the correlations
among the independent ﬁrm-level variables in Panel D. Most of the
correlations are small and are unlikely to result in multicollinearity.
3.2. Basic Audit Fee Model
The Basic Audit Fee Model (BAFM) includes the normal determi-
nants of audit fees identiﬁed in previous studies (Simunic, 1980;
Craswell and Francis, 1999; Seetharaman et al., 2002; Srinidhi et al.,
2009), but excludes the treatment variables speciﬁc to our study.7 The
included variables are size8 (SIZE), inherent risk (INVREC), control
and other misstatement risks (proxied by OPIN), operating risk (LOSS
and LEV), liquidity (QUICK), proﬁtability (ROA), and complexity
(FOREIGN, DISCOP, CROSS, UTILITY). We also include audit
tenure (TENURE) based on evidence reported in previous studies
(e.g., Myers et al., 2003; Ghosh and Moon, 2005; Carey and Simnett,
2006; Srinidhi et al., 2007). We include the indicator variable BIG for
Big-N auditors (Big-5 before Andersen’s demise and Big-4 thereafter).
In addition to the above client-speciﬁc variables, we include several
countrywide variables that measure the overall demand for assurance.
The ﬁrst is the disclosure index for the country (LCIFAR) developed
by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research
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(CIFAR, 1995) to proxy for the information demanded by the market
(Seetharaman et al., 2002; Knechel and Willekens, 2006). The second
is the country’s stock market capitalization (SMDEV) relative to its
gross domestic product (GDP), which proxies for market maturity
(Beck et al., 2000). The third is the auditor litigation risk (AUDRISK)
index of Wingate (1997). We also control for ownership concentration
(OWNCON) because auditing has been shown to play a corporate
governance role when there is an agency conﬂict between majority and
minority shareholders in East Asian countries, where ﬁrms are charac-
terized by highly concentrated ownership among insiders (Fan and
Wong, 2005). Lastly, we control for analyst following (ANACOV)
because a higher level of analyst interest signiﬁes greater scrutiny and
could aﬀect audit fees (Kini et al., 2003).
Although Andersen’s demise occurred in mid-2002, its problems were
apparent from late 2001. For our study, we treat Andersen’s demise as
having occurred at the end of 2001. We use the indicator variable POST
(indicating whether the period in question is 2002–2004 [POST = 1] or
1999–2001 [POST = 0]) as another fee-determining variable.9 The
BAFM (Model 1) is a pooled cross-sectional model deﬁned as follows10:
LFEE ¼b0 þ b1SIZEþ b2INVRECþ b3OPINþ b4LOSSþ b5LEV
þ b6QUICKþ b7ROAþ b8FOREIGNþ b9DISCOP
þ b10CROSSþ b11UTILITYþ b12TENUREþ b13BIG
þ b14LCIFARþ b15SMDEVþ b16AUDRISK
þ b17OWNCONþ b18ANACOVþ b19POSTþ e1
ð1Þ
The BAFM regression estimates given in Model (1) of Table 3 are
consistent with those of previous studies and our own expectations.
Size, inherent risk, operating risk, and complexity are positively related
with audit fees. Liquidity and proﬁtability reduce risk and have a
negative relationship with audit fees. Consistent with other studies
(e.g., Srinidhi et al., 2009), TENURE has a negative relationship with
audit fees. UTILITY has a negative coeﬃcient, consistent with the
argument that utility ﬁrms are less risky because they are regulated.
LCIFAR proxies the market’s demand for information and is thus
positively associated with audit fees. The stock market development
index SMDEV is also positively associated with audit fees. As
expected, higher litigation exposure among auditors and concentrated
ownership increase audit risk, and hence are positively associated with
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audit fees, whereas greater analyst coverage reduces audit risk, and
hence is negatively associated with audit fees. The positive association
with BIG indicates a signiﬁcant Big-N premium. The signiﬁcant and
positive coeﬃcient for POST indicates a signiﬁcant increase in average
audit fees after Andersen’s demise. We also include an interaction term
POST*BIG in Model (2). The coeﬃcient for POST*BIG is positive,
but insigniﬁcant, suggesting that Big-N auditors did not increase their
client fees from the pre-demise period to the post-demise period.
3.3. Relative Audit Fee Changes for Ex-Andersen Clients
We use two related tests to examine Hypothesis 1. In the ﬁrst test, we
examine relative audit fee changes for ex-Andersen clients who
switched to one of the remaining Big-N ﬁrms. Our base model in this
test for audit fees is estimated for each Big-N audit ﬁrm in the period
Table 3. Changes in the Big-N Fee Premium before and after Andersen’s
Demise
Variable Model 1 (Basic or BAFM) Model 2 (Basic or BAFM)
Intercept 9.828 (9.86)*** 9.841 (9.86)***
SIZE 0.612 (149.35)*** 0.612 (149.27)***
INVREC 0.688 (22.19)*** 0.688 (22.19)***
OPIN 0.073 (2.60)*** 0.073 (2.61)***
LOSS 0.284 (19.61)*** 0.284 (19.61)***
LEV 0.036 (1.57) 0.036 (1.58)
QUICK 0.008 (8.73)*** 0.008 (8.73)***
ROA 0.005 (5.39)*** 0.005 (5.39)***
FOREIGN 0.345 (22.24)*** 0.345 (22.24)***
DISCOP 0.127 (2.31)** 0.127 (2.31)**
CROSS 0.474 (13.80)*** 0.474 (13.80)***
UTILITY 0.492 (11.86)*** 0.492 (11.85)***
TENURE 0.015 (7.49)*** 0.015 (7.49)***
BIG 0.342 (21.49)*** 0.336 (14.70)***
LCIFAR 3.092 (13.97)*** 3.094 (13.97)***
SMDEV 0.081 (4.65)*** 0.081 (4.66)***
AUDRISK 0.027 (5.81)*** 0.027 (5.80)***
OWNCON 4.031 (41.20)*** 4.031 (41.20)***
ANACOV 0.033 (14.03)*** 0.033 (14.03)***
POST 0.190 (13.95)*** 0.182 (6.48)***
POST*BIG 0.010 (0.34)
Adj R2 (%) 79.83 79.83
F-statistic 2,900.80*** 2898.08***
N 19,046 19,046
Note Variable deﬁnitions and models are given in Exhibit 1. To conserve space, we do not
report the coeﬃcient estimates for the year dummies. ***, **, *denote statistical signiﬁcant at
1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
The Eﬀect of Arthur Andersen’s Demise 221
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
after Andersen’s demise (2002–2004), excluding both ex-Andersen and
non-Andersen switch-ins. In the second test, our base model for audit
fees is estimated for each Big-N audit ﬁrm in the period before Ander-
sen’s demise (1999–2001). In both cases, abnormal audit fees are com-
puted for the 2002–2004 period and the regression is estimated
separately for each country.
3.3.1. Diﬀerential client risk premium for ex-Andersen clients over other
switch-ins. We estimate Model 1 for existing client ﬁrms (excluding
switch-ins) separately for each of the four audit ﬁrms in the
post-demise period. Let the audit fee model be parsimoniously rep-
resented as LFEE ¼ a0 þ
Pm
k¼1 akxk þ e1, where xk captures the m
variables in Model (1) for each Big-N auditor (the variables BIG,
LCIFAR, SMDEV, AUDRISK, OWNCON, ANACOV, and POST
are no longer necessary), and let ɛ1 be the abnormal audit fee,
which, by construction, has a mean value of 0 for existing clients.
Let the set fa^kg denotes the estimated values of
fakg for k ¼ 0; 1; . . .m.
We model the audit fees of switch-in ﬁrms (both ex-Andersen and
non-Andersen) as LFEE ¼ a^0 þ
Pm
k¼1 a^kxk þ d^NAADN þ d^AADA þ e,
where DA is an indicator variable for ex-Andersen switch-ins and DN
is an indicator variable for non-Andersen switch-ins. The higher fees
charged by the audit ﬁrm in response to the additional risk of
ex-Andersen clients are reﬂected in the diﬀerence in abnormal audit
fees ðd^AA  d^NAAÞ. Hypothesis H1.1.1 is supported if the abnormal fee
for ex-Andersen switch-ins is signiﬁcantly higher than the abnormal
fee for non-Andersen switch-ins for each of the Big-N audit ﬁrms.
Panel A of Table 4 provides the mean abnormal fees for ex-Ander-
sen switch-ins (sub-sample G1) and non-Andersen switch-ins (sub-
sample G2) for each of the Big-N auditors: Price Waterhouse Coopers
(PWC), KPMG Peat Marwick (KPMG), Ernst and Young (EY), and
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (DT). The coeﬃcients of the audit fee
models are separately estimated for each audit ﬁrm for the 2002–2004
period excluding all the switch-ins, and the mean abnormal fees are
then estimated for both ex-Andersen and non-Andersen switch-ins for
the 2002–2004 period. The last column presents abnormal fees com-
puted using an aggregate expectation model for all Big-N auditors.
The test of means shows that for each Big-N audit ﬁrm, the mean
abnormal fee charged to ex-Andersen clients is signiﬁcantly positive
(which shows that it is higher than the mean fee charged to similar
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existing clients) and is higher than the mean abnormal fee charged to
non-Andersen switch-ins.11 These results support the ﬁrst part of the
risk hypothesis, H1.1.1. We also note that the mean abnormal fee for
Andersen switch-ins is similar for EY and DT, higher for KPMG, and
signiﬁcantly higher for PWC. This suggests that PWC might have
exercised greater auditor conservatism than the other Big-4 auditors.
In the second part of the test, we decompose the ex-Andersen-client
sample into two sub-samples: sub-sample G1A consisting of early
switchers (those that switched in 2001) with greater bargaining
power,12 and sub-sample G1B comprising late switchers (those that
switched in 2002) with severely curtailed bargaining power due to the
demise of Andersen. However, when we split the sample into two
parts, the sample sizes for each auditor become too small for meaning-
ful analysis. We therefore provide aggregate results for the Big-N audi-
tors in Panel B.
The results show that both sub-samples G1A and G1B exhibit signiﬁ-
cantly higher abnormal audit fees than does sub-sample G2 (rows 4 and
5), i.e., both early switchers and late switchers paid higher abnormal
audit fees. However, the diﬀerence between them (row 6) is not signiﬁ-
cant, i.e., there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the abnormal fees
charged to early and late switchers. To the extent that the timing of the
switch reﬂects bargaining power, this lack of signiﬁcance shows that the
diﬀerence in bargaining power between the two sub-samples does not
drive the abnormal fee premium for ex-Andersen clients switching to
Big-N auditors over non-Andersen switch-ins. Together, the results in
Panels A and B support H1.2 that the higher abnormal audit fee paid
by ex-Andersen switch-ins in comparison with that paid by non-Ander-
sen switch-ins was not driven by reduced bargaining power.
3.3.2. Diﬀerential ex-Andersen client risk premium allowing for time-based
changes. The preceding analysis of the diﬀerential ex-Andersen client
risk premium uses an estimate that covers the period after Andersen’s
demise. However, the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other
events between the two periods may have had signiﬁcant eﬀects on
audit fees. In this section, we use the period before Andersen’s demise
as the estimation period, and employ the period after its demise as the
event period to compute the abnormal audit fee charged by each Big-
N audit ﬁrm as follows:
Let LFEE ¼ a^0 þ
Pm
k¼1 a^kxk þ e represent the estimated audit fee
model for each of the Big-4 audit ﬁrms based only on the pre-demise per-
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iod for all clients, including those that switched to other auditors after the
demise. The audit fee for the period after Andersen’s demise for all ﬁrms is
LFEE ¼ a^0 þ
Xm
k¼1
a^kxk þ k^AADA þ k^NAADN þ k^PPOSTþ e
In the foregoing expression, DA and DN are indicators for ex-
Andersen and non-Andersen switch-ins, respectively, and POST is an
indicator variable for the post-event period. The abnormal fee k^P
includes all of the time-based eﬀects and any potential rent increases.
From this expression, we obtain the following:
G1 = the mean abnormal fee for ex-Andersen switch-ins
=k^AA þ k^P;
G2 = the mean abnormal fee for non-Andersen switch-ins
=k^NAA þ k^P;
G3 = the mean abnormal fee for existing clients = k^P
(G1–G2) measures additional risk premiums for ex-Andersen clients
compared with non-Andersen switch-ins. Similarly, (G1–G3) measures
additional risk premiums for ex-Andersen clients over existing clients.
(G2–G3) measures the non-Andersen switch-in premium.
Panel C of Table 4 estimates audit fees in the 1999–2001 period for
each Big-N audit ﬁrm. Estimates from this model are used to deter-
mine post-demise abnormal audit fees. Consistent with Hypothesis
H1.1.1, all Big-N audit ﬁrms show a consistent additional risk pre-
mium for ex-Andersen clients over non-Andersen switch-ins (positive
G1–G2). Consistent with Hypothesis H1.1.2, all four ﬁrms show a con-
sistent additional risk premium for ex-Andersen clients over existing
clients (positive G1–G3). A comparison of G2 and G3 fails to show a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence for any Big-N ﬁrm, suggesting no signiﬁcant
switch-in premiums were charged for non-Andersen switch-ins. These
results support Hypothesis H1.1.
Panel D gives the results for the ex-Andersen sample disaggregated
into early and late switchers, G1A and G1B, respectively. Consistent
with H1.2, the coeﬃcients for both G1A and G1B are signiﬁcantly
higher than those for G2 and G3, but the diﬀerence between them is
not signiﬁcant. These results support Hypothesis H1.2 that the
premium Big-N auditors charged ex-Andersen clients was not driven
by the low bargaining power of these clients.
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3.4. Earnings Quality of Former Andersen Clients
In this section, we examine whether the additional risk of ex-Andersen
clients can be attributed to the diﬀerence in earnings quality13 between
ex-Andersen clients and other clients.
We use the accruals quality measure developed by Francis et al.
(2005) to proxy for earnings quality. Speciﬁcally, we use country-
year-industry level pooled cross-sectional regressions with total current
accruals as the dependent variable, and employ cash ﬂow in the previous,
current, and subsequent years and changes in revenue and PPE as inde-
pendent variables.14 The residual in the regression represents the part of
accruals that cannot be explained by past, current, or future cash ﬂows
or by sales or investment. The higher this residual, the lower is accruals
quality. Consistent with this rationale, accruals quality at the ﬁrm-year
level can be measured (inversely) by the absolute value of the residual
(Dechow and Dichev, 2002; – footnote 6). Accordingly, and in an
approach consistent with that of Srinidhi and Gul (2007), we use the
absolute value of the residual as our measure of accruals quality. We
multiply the absolute value of the residual by 1, so that higher
values indicate superior accruals quality. We denote this variable as
AQ. Investor reaction has been shown to be greater for AQ than for
other measures of earnings quality (Francis et al., 2004, 2005). We
note that the accruals quality measure has also been used to gauge
earnings quality in several prior studies (e.g., Myers et al., 2003;
Ghosh and Moon, 2005).15
We use Model 2 to test the accruals quality diﬀerential of Andersen
clients.
AQ ¼ b0 þ b1SIZEþ b2OPINþ b3LOSSþ b4LEVþ b5ROA
þ b6FOREIGNþ b7DISCOPþ b8CROSSþ b9UTILITY
þ b10BIGþ b11TENUREþ b12LFEEþ b13rREV þ b14rCFO
þ b15LCIFARþ b16SMDEVþ b17AUDRISKþ b18OWNCON
þ b19ANACOVþ b20POSTþ b21AAþ b22AA  POSTþ e3 ð2Þ
In Model 2, AA is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Andersen
clients in both the pre- and post-demise periods and 0 otherwise. We
use several control variables that relate to ﬁrm-speciﬁc and country-
speciﬁc factors. These include the client ﬁrm’s size (the log of total
assets in U.S.A. dollars) and proﬁtability (return on assets) (Krishnan
et al., 2008). Dechow and Dichev, (2002) identify the variability of
228 Bin Srinidhi, Mahmud Hossain and Chee Yeow Lim
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
sales and operating cash ﬂows as innate factors over which auditors
might have limited inﬂuence. Accordingly, we use standard deviations
in both sales and operating cash ﬂow over the previous 5 years as con-
trol variables. We include the complexity of operations (foreign opera-
tions) because the application of U.S.A. standards to foreign
operations is likely to be more error-prone. We also include cross-list-
ing in the United States of America because it has been shown to
improve earnings quality (Lang and Yetman, 2003). Utility ﬁrms are
regulated and could therefore exhibit systematically diﬀerent earnings
quality. Moreover, because internal control and other misstatement
risks have been shown to be associated with accruals quality (Doyle
Table 5. Accruals Quality of Ex-Andersen Clients in the Periods before and
after Andersen’s Demise
Variable Before After Pooled
Intercept 0.536 (3.17)*** 0.622 (3.75)*** 0.600 (5.17)***
SIZE 0.004 (4.87)*** 0.005 (4.98)*** 0.005 (7.70)***
OPIN 0.001 (0.01) 0.004 (0.98) 0.002 (0.67)
LOSS 0.003 (1.40) 0.001 (0.29) 0.001 (0.75)
LEV 0.027 (11.43)*** 0.015 (5.23)*** 0.022 (11.75)***
ROA 0.120 (14.37)*** 0.105 (11.17)*** 0.114 (18.38)***
FOREIGN 0.001 (0.80) 0.001 (0.36) 0.001 (0.13)
DISCOP 0.001 (0.11) 0.020 (1.90)* 0.007 (1.31)
CROSS 0.002 (0.53) 0.007 (1.38) 0.005 (1.44)
UTILITY 0.015 (2.29)** 0.014 (1.93)* 0.014 (2.84)***
BIG 0.003 (1.46) 0.001 (0.04) 0.001 (0.93)
TENURE 0.001 (0.66) 0.001 (0.03) 0.001 (0.23)
LFEE 0.001 (0.98) 0.001 (0.50) 0.001 (0.64)
rREV 0.011 (4.14)*** 0.018 (4.32)*** 0.014 (6.30)***
rCFO 0.038 (4.51)*** 0.002 (0.41) 0.006 (1.79)*
LCIFAR 0.125 (3.33)*** 0.141 (3.75)*** 0.141 (5.46)***
SMDEV 0.002 (0.51) 0.012 (2.79)*** 0.002 (0.71)
AUDRISK 0.002 (2.16)** 0.004 (4.42)*** 0.002 (3.56)***
OWNCON 0.046 (2.74)*** 0.113 (5.87)*** 0.065 (5.32)***
ANACOV 0.001 (1.35) 0.001 (1.33) 0.001 (0.70)
AA 0.001 (0.06) 0.007 (2.32)** 0.001 (0.33)
POST 0.002 (1.04)
AA*POST 0.006 (2.26)**
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 (%) 16.02 13.84 14.64
F-Statistic 51.04 32.57 72.57
N 5,248 3,933 9,181
Notes: This table shows the results of accruals quality (Model 3) estimation for both pre-
Andersen-demise period 1999–2001 and post-demise period 2002–2004. Variable deﬁnitions
and models are given in Exhibit 1. To conserve space, we do not report the coeﬃcient esti-
mates for the year dummies. ***, **, * denote statistical signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10% lev-
els (two-tailed), respectively.
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et al., 2007), we include the auditor’s opinion to proxy for these risks.
Loss propensity and leverage have also been shown to aﬀect earnings
quality (Hayn, 1995; Pinnuck and Lillis, 2007). In addition to these
ﬁrm-level attributes, prior studies have identiﬁed audit tenure as a vari-
able that might have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the quality of earnings
(Myers et al., 2003; Ghosh and Moon, 2005; Carey and Simnett, 2006;
Srinidhi et al., 2007). As the country-level variables we use in Model 1
are also relevant to earnings quality, we include them all in Model 2.
Table 5 gives the results of Model 2 for both the pre-demise period
(1999–2001) and the post-demise period (2002–2004). Consistent with
Hypothesis H1.3, we ﬁnd that AA is not signiﬁcant in the pre-demise
period, suggesting that Andersen clients did not exhibit poorer accruals
quality after controlling for the variables in Model 2. In the
post-demise period, accruals quality is signiﬁcantly higher for
ex-Andersen clients. Our test of the model in which we use POST as a
dummy variable and the interaction AA*POST shows that the interac-
tion term is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, further conﬁrming
the result whereby after the switch, the accruals quality of ex-Andersen
clients was higher than that of equivalent non-Andersen clients. These
results support Hypothesis H1.3.
3.4.1. Eﬀect of legal and extra-legal variables on Andersen client
premium
We use abnormal audit fees—the residuals from the Basic Audit Fee
Model we estimate earlier—as our dependent variable. We estimate
abnormal audit fees by employing both the approaches used to test
Hypothesis H1.1. In the ﬁrst approach, abnormal audit fees are esti-
mated for the Andersen and non-Andersen switch-ins. In the second
approach, abnormal fees are estimated for the switch-ins from both
Andersen and non-Andersen Big-4 audit ﬁrms, as well as for ongoing
clients. In both approaches, we compare the abnormal fees of Ander-
sen clients with those of non-Andersen clients. Using metrics for legal
or extra-legal variables (denoted as MEASURE), we estimate the fol-
lowing regression.16
AAF ¼ a0 þ a1MEASUREþ a2AAþ a3MEASURE*AAþ e ð3Þ
In Model 3, AAF is abnormal audit fees, and MEASURE proxies
for countrywide legal and extra-legal variables. The interaction term
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MEASURE*AA captures the change in audit fees for ex-Andersen
clients. We test Hypothesis H2 by the interaction term MEA-
SURE*AA. A negative coeﬃcient indicates a substitutive eﬀect
whereby the premium charged to ex-Andersen clients is reduced by a
higher value of MEASURE. A positive coeﬃcient, on the other hand,
indicates a complementary relationship.
Table 6 gives the results of Model 3 applied separately for the legal
variables (rule of law (RULE) and eﬃciency of the judicial system
[EFF]) and the extra-legal variables (product market competition
(COMP), per capita circulation of daily newspapers [NEWS], and
compliance with tax laws [TAX]). Panel A gives the abnormal fee esti-
mates for both Andersen and non-Andersen switch-ins for the period
after Andersen’s demise. The coeﬃcients for both the legal and the
three extra-legal variables (MEASURE) are signiﬁcant and positive,
signifying that countries with better legal and extra-legal institutions
demand more extensive audits. The coeﬃcient of AA is positive and
signiﬁcant, signifying that ex-Andersen clients were charged higher fees
after controlling for known audit risk characteristics. The coeﬃcient on
the interaction term MEASURE*AA is negative and signiﬁcant in four
of the ﬁve cases (except when MEASURE = TAX). This result suggests
a substitutive relation, i.e., the premium charged to ex-Andersen clients
is smaller in countries with better legal and extra-legal institutions. This
ﬁnding corroborates that of Choi et al. (2008), who ﬁnd a substitutive
relation between strong institutions and premium audit fees.
Panel B gives the abnormal fees estimated for the period before
Andersen’s demise for Andersen switch-ins, non-Andersen switch-ins,
and existing clients. As in Panel A, all of the variables (denoted as
MEASURE) have positive coeﬃcients. This result is consistent with
increased demand for audit eﬀort in the presence of strong legal and
extra-legal institutions. All of the coeﬃcients for the interaction term
MEASURE*AA (except TAX) are negative, indicating that stronger
institutions reduce the ex-Andersen risk premium. This evidence allows
us to reject the null hypothesis H2, and provides evidence that the
countrywide institutional variables reduce the speciﬁc risk premium for
ex-Andersen clients.
3.4.2. Interpretation of our results
Our results on the treatment of Andersen clients by their successor audi-
tors reveal that they were charged an audit fee premium, even though
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they did not exhibit lower earnings quality. We also show that this audit
fee premium is not likely to have been driven by the lesser ability of
late-switching Andersen clients to bargain. Furthermore, successor audi-
tors required their ex-Andersen clients to exhibit higher earnings quality
than their existing clients and non-Andersen switch-ins. These results
are consistent with the auditor conservatism argument. The results also
conform to the evidence documented by Cahan and Zhang (2006).
However, it is instructive to compare these results with those of
Kohlbeck et al. (2008). They show that early switchers in the United
States of America did not pay a premium or receive a discount from
their successor auditors. Our results show that in the international mar-
ket, early switchers paid a premium, even though they had greater bar-
gaining power than late switchers. This could be attributed to the
relatively relaxed regulatory environment outside the United States of
America. Kohlbeck et al. (2008) also ﬁnd that clients whose audit oﬃces
were purchased by other auditors, but still chose to change auditors
were the only ones who paid premium audit fees. This is because the
Big-N auditors face stronger competition in the United States of Amer-
ica than they do in other countries, and are thus under greater competi-
tive pressure to attract clients by oﬀering discounts. Furthermore,
because Andersen’s clients did not exhibit lower earnings quality, and
because the U.S.A. legal system relies more on objective defensibility
than on subjective perceptions, there was no reason to charge Andersen
clients a premium (Cahan et al., 2009). The premium demanded from
clients who chose not to stay with the oﬃces purchased seems to have
been driven by the additional costs incurred by their successor auditors,
who did not purchase those oﬃces precisely because of these additional
costs. Overall, the dynamics of the U.S.A. audit market diﬀer signiﬁ-
cantly from those of the non-American audit market. Our additional
tests on the U.S.A. market conﬁrm this diﬀerence in dynamics.
4. Additional Tests
4.1. Eﬀect of Audit Fees on the Accruals Quality of ex-Andersen
Clients
In an exploratory test, we estimate an extension of Model 2 in which
we introduce the following interactions in addition to those reported
in Table 5: LFEE*POST, LFEE*AA, and LFEE*AA*POST. Our un-
tabulated results indicate that the coeﬃcient on the interaction term
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LFEE*POST is positive, but not signiﬁcant, showing that the relation
between audit fee and accruals quality (for all clients) was not signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀected by the demise of Andersen and the movement of its cli-
ents to other auditors. The interaction term LFEE*AA is positive, but
not signiﬁcant, indicating that the relation between audit fee and accru-
als quality was not diﬀerent for Andersen clients when they were audited
by Andersen and had not switched to a new auditor. However, the coef-
ﬁcient of the three-way interaction LFEE*POST*AA is positive and sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% level. This shows that the relation between audit fee
and accruals quality was higher for ex-Andersen clients than for other
clients. This result suggests that although audit fees increased for
ex-Andersen clients, their improvement in accruals quality was higher
than is typically warranted by the change in audit fees. This might point
to an interesting signaling phenomenon among ex-Andersen clients who
willingly improved their earnings quality beyond the level warranted by
the increase in audit fees. However, this analysis is exploratory only and
cannot be viewed as providing conclusive evidence.
4.2. Use of Alternative Measures for Earnings Quality
We use performance-adjusted discretionary accruals17 as an alternative
measure of earnings quality. As in the case of the accruals quality
measure, our (untabulated) results indicate that the earnings quality of
ex-Andersen clients was higher after the switch than was that of
non-Andersen clients with similar characteristics (lower discretionary
accruals). Moreover, all of the results reported in Section 4.1 with the
interactions are similar to those obtained with the accruals quality
measure. These tests show that our ﬁndings are robust.
4.3. Audit Fee Eﬀects in the United States of America
Auditors in the United States of America face more litigation than
their international counterparts (Khurana and Raman, 2004). For the
purpose of comparison, Table 7 presents the results of analyzing U.S.
A. audit fees after Andersen’s demise.
The individual auditor analysis reveals some diﬀerences between the
United States of America and international samples. Panel A of
Table 7 shows that the mean abnormal audit fee for Andersen switch-
ins is signiﬁcantly higher than that for non-Andersen switch-ins only
for Ernst and Young. A similar pattern is observed in Panel B of
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Table 7: only Ernst and Young’s results show a signiﬁcantly higher
mean abnormal fee for ex-Andersen clients than for non-Andersen cli-
ents. However, given that most Arthur Andersen practices were
acquired by Ernst and Young, the similarity of this result to that of the
international sample is signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, no consistent pattern
across the four auditors is evident in terms of the diﬀerence between the
mean abnormal audit fee for ex-Andersen clients and that for existing
clients. This could be partially attributed to Andersen clients who
moved with Andersen oﬃces—mostly to Ernst and Young—facing
higher audit premiums, whereas those who switched to new auditors
before the oﬃce was purchased did not (Kohlbeck et al., 2008, p.1142).
4.4. Restricted and Extended Samples
We repeat our analysis for a reduced sample of 12,810 ﬁrm-year obser-
vations that excludes the “dirty period” of 2001–2002 to ensure that
our results are not driven by instability in the period surrounding
Andersen’s demise. We also repeat our analysis using an extended
sample that covers the 1996–2004 period. The untabulated results of
both analyses are qualitatively similar to those reported above.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we examine how the failure of Andersen aﬀected audit
pricing and perceived earnings quality for ex-Andersen clients in the
international audit market.
The ﬁrst issue we examine is whether successor Big-N auditors
charged a fee premium for ex-Andersen clients, and if they did,
whether the premium is attributable to lower pre-demise earnings
quality, decreased bargaining power, or Big-N conservatism with
regard to their ex-Andersen clients. Although our results show a fee
premium for ex-Andersen clients, we do not ﬁnd lower earnings qual-
ity for ex-Andersen clients before the demise of Andersen. In other
words, even though these client ﬁrms did not have lower quality earn-
ings than did other clients of the remaining Big-N audit ﬁrms, they
were charged an audit fee premium higher than that paid by switch-ins
from other Big-N audit ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that this fee premium cannot be
attributed to the reduced bargaining power of ex-Andersen clients.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that after ex-Andersen clients switched to a new
auditor, their earnings quality was signiﬁcantly higher than that of
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other clients of the remaining Big-N auditors after controlling for
other factors. These results strongly suggest a pattern of Big-N auditor
conservatism with regard to their ex-Andersen clients. In particular,
they charged them higher audit fees, conducted more rigorous audits
than those conducted for other switch-ins and ongoing clients, and held
them to higher reporting quality standards. Within the Big-N auditors,
we ﬁnd that the premiums charged by PWC and KPMG were higher
than those charged by DT and EY. In an exploratory analysis, we also
ﬁnd evidence consistent with ex-Andersen clients themselves trying to
signal their higher earnings quality after Andersen’s demise.
The second issue we examine is whether legal and extra-legal coun-
try-level institutions aﬀected the risk premium of ex-Andersen clients.
Our results show that stronger institutions are negatively associated
with the ex-Andersen client fee premium. Our comparison of audit fee
premiums across diﬀerent countries yields further insights. We ﬁnd
that in countries with strong legal and extra-legal institutions, the addi-
tional audit fee premium charged to ex-Andersen clients declined more
than it did in countries with weaker institutions. This ﬁnding suggests
that audit risk assessments conducted by Big-N auditors in countries
with strong legal and extra-legal institutions were based primarily on
measurable earnings quality. This is not the case in countries with
weaker institutions. The “loss of reputation” eﬀect (resulting from the
demise of Andersen) seems to have been more pronounced in countries
with weak institutions, and risk assessments were therefore higher than
warranted by earnings quality in these countries. This eﬀect of legal
and extra-legal institutions on auditor risk assessment is a new contri-
bution to the literature. These results are robust to the inclusion or
exclusion of the “dirty” sample period during which Andersen was
undergoing reputational loss and was in a process of demise, the
extension of the pre-event sample period, and the inclusion of second-
tier auditors as additional control variables.
Our ﬁndings based on the U.S.A. sample, where the dynamics of
the audit market are markedly diﬀerent from those in the international
market, are nevertheless similar to those obtained from the interna-
tional sample in that Ernst and Young, which bought the majority of
Andersen practices, charged a premium for Andersen clients over their
existing clients and non-Andersen switch-ins.
Two implications of this study are of particular interest. The ﬁrst is
that after Andersen’s demise, its clients were charged a premium audit
fee by succeeding Big-N auditors in the international market, even
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though there was no earnings quality impairment before the switch-in
for Andersen clients. This conservative behavior among Big-N auditors
appears at ﬁrst blush surprising in the international market because of
the lower litigation risks they face in comparison to those experienced
in the U.S.A. market. However, a lack of conﬁdence in objective evi-
dence such as earnings quality results in greater reliance on reputation
built up in the United States of America and acts as the driver of con-
servatism. The second implication is that strong country-level legal
and extra-legal institutions beneﬁt investors in two ways: ﬁrst, by
increasing the demand for audit services, and thereby providing greater
assurance for ﬁnancial statements; and second, by reducing variation
in the demand for audit services driven by speciﬁc risk factors, such as
the demise of Andersen. In eﬀect, strong institutions provide a more
stable environment for investors who rely on audited ﬁnancial state-
ments. Admittedly, our sample is limited by data availability and our
results should thus be interpreted with caution when generalizing to
countries outside of the sample.
Notes
1. At the time of its demise, Andersen had a very strong presence outside North Amer-
ica, with operations in 83 countries and more than 50% of its USD 9.3 billion revenue
for the year ending August 2001 coming from outside the U.S. and Canada. After its
demise, a majority of the ex-Arthur Andersen practices around the world merged with
Ernst & Young LLP (Burger and Reyes-Guerra, 2003). See also http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Arthur_Andersen, pp.4–5.
2. We did not make distinction between clients who switched after March 2002 but
before the Andersen oﬃces were formally acquired or closed or included them in the
post-demise. All switchers before this date are considered early switchers with higher
bargaining power. We believe once Andersen was indicted, there was limited bargaining
power for their clients regardless of whether they switched in the “lead” period or after
the Andersen oﬃce was acquired by another auditor.
3. The strength of legal institutions in the country is measured by the rule of law index
and the eﬃciency of judicial systems developed in La Porta et al. (1998). The strength
of extra-legal institutions in the country is measured using competition laws, press cov-
erage and tax compliance developed in Haw et al. (2004). All the variables are
described in Section 2.2.1 and deﬁned in Exhibit 1.
4. See Table 3 in the study of Cahan and Zhang (2006). The diﬀerence in abnormal
accruals in 2001 is 0.009 with a standard deviation of 0.144, which renders it statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant. Similarly, the diﬀerence in adjusted abnormal accruals is 0.005 with
a standard deviation of 0.157.
5. For example, the risk faced by auditors in Malaysia may depend on the political
connections of the client, in addition to earnings quality (Gul, 2006).
6. We extend the sample to the 1996–2004 period to test the robustness of our results,
and also conduct a separate analysis for U.S. ﬁrms. We report these results as addi-
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tional tests. The country and region selection process is limited by data availability.
However, the countries and regions in the sample span Europe and Asia, and range
from city-states such as Singapore to large economies such as the United Kingdom.
They also represent diﬀerent legal systems (code law and civil law) and ﬁnancing sys-
tems (debt-based and equity-based).
7. There are over a 100 studies on the determinants of audit fees. See, for example,
Hay et al. (2006) for a meta- analysis of the literature.
8. The variables are deﬁned in Exhibit 1.
9. POST refers to the distinction made in the full sample. In the reduced sample, we
exclude the “dirty” period of 2001–2002 and use POST as an indicator variable that
takes the value of 1 for the 2003–2004 period and 0 for the 1999–2000 period. The
reduced sample POST is also a POST variable for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
which had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on audit fees. We also run an additional test in which the
pre-exit period is extended to 1996, in which case POST = 0 for the 1996–2001 period.
10. For notational simplicity, we do not show subscripts i (for the ﬁrm) and t (for the
year). Moreover, to address the problem of outliers, we remove all observations in the
top and bottom 1% from the sample.
11. This result is inconsistent with the alternative explanation of low-balling (switch-in
discount) to attract non-Andersen clients but no low-balling for Andersen clients who
were forced to switch. The signiﬁcantly positive mean abnormal audit fee for ex-Ander-
sen clients provides evidence of a switch-in premium for ex-Andersen clients for each of
the Big-N auditors. The absence of a positive mean abnormal audit fee for non-Ander-
sen clients indicates no switch-in premium for them. The evidence of switch-in dis-
counts for non-Andersen clients exists only for Deloitte-Touche.
12. Barton (2005) shows that ﬁrms with greater reputation at stake chose to switch ear-
lier when they had more choices available and therefore, had greater bargaining power
with new potential auditors than late switchers.
13. We note that increased auditor attention and a consequent improvement in audit
quality are likely to have taken place irrespective of whether investors were actually
more concerned about ex-Andersen clients or whether this was merely a perception
among the other Big-N auditors.
14. We employ the 13 industries deﬁned by Frankel et al. (2002). For each country,
industry and year, we require at least 10 ﬁrms to run the regression.
15. We also use other measures of earnings quality such as performance-adjusted dis-
cretionary accruals. We present the results as an additional analysis.
16. Further, we also run Model 3 with additional country-level control variables –
LCIFAR, SMDEV, AUDRISK, OWNCON and ANACOV. The results are qualita-
tively similar.
17. Performance-adjusted signed discretionary accruals are obtained by subtracting
from each ﬁrm’s abnormal accruals the median abnormal accrual from the correspond-
ing ROA-industry decile to which the ﬁrm belongs. Abnormal accrual is estimated by a
modiﬁed Jones model for each country-year in each industry deﬁned by Frankel et al.
(2002) with a minimum of 10 observations. This approach is similar to that used by
Ashbaugh et al. (2003).
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. Exhibit 1. Deﬁnitions of the variables
Firm-speciﬁc variables
LFEE Log of audit fees, in thousands of U.S.$
SIZE Log of assets, in millions of U.S.$
INVREC Sum of inventory and receivables, divided by total assets
OPIN 1 for an unqualiﬁed audit opinion, and 0 otherwise
LOSS 1 if the ﬁrm is reporting a loss, and 0 otherwise
LEV Total liabilities divided by total assets
QUICK Current assets minus inventory, divided by current liabilities
ROA Returns on assets
FOREIGN 1 if foreign income before-tax is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise
DISCOP 1 if the ﬁrm reports discontinued operations, and 0 otherwise
CROSS 1 if the ﬁrm cross-lists in the United States, and 0 otherwise
UTILITY 1 if the ﬁrm is in the utility industry, and 0 otherwise
TENURE Auditor tenure in years
BIG 1 if the client is audited by a Big-N auditor
POST 1 if the period is 2002–2004 and 0 if the period is from 1999 to 2001
AA 1 if the client is audited by former AA, both in the pre-and post-demise
period
AQ Accruals quality computed as the negative of the absolute value of
residuals estimated from country-year-industry level pooled
cross-sectional regressions with total current accruals as the
dependent variable and cash ﬂow in the previous, current, and
subsequent years and the changes in revenue and PPE as independent
variables. Higher values indicate a higher accruals quality
rREV Standard deviation of sales deﬂated by total assets, over the current and
prior 4 years
rCFO Standard deviation of operating cash ﬂow deﬂated by total assets, over
the current and prior 4 years
Legal variables
RULE Rule of law index as reported in La Porta et al. (1998). This is the
assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by
the country risk-rating agency International Country Risk (ICR), scaled
from zero to 10 with higher scores indicating a greater tradition of law
and order
EFF Eﬃciency of the judicial system measure reported in La Porta et al.
(1998). This is the assessment of the “eﬃciency and integrity of the
legal environment as it aﬀects business, particularly foreign ﬁrms”
produced by the country risk-rating agency Business International
Corp. It “may be taken to represent investors’ assessment of conditions
in the country in questions.” Scaled from zero to 10, with higher
scores indicating higher levels of eﬃciency
Extra-legal variables
COMP The eﬀectiveness of product market competition reported in Dyck and
Zingales (2004). Higher scores suggest the general agreement that
product market competition is eﬀective
NEWS The circulation of daily newspapers divided by the population, as
reported in Dyck and Zingales (2004)
TAX The rate of tax compliance measure from Dyck and Zingales (2004)
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Country control variables
LCIFAR Log of the CIFAR disclosure index. CIFAR creates a country-speciﬁc
index by rating the annual reports of at least three ﬁrms in every country
for inclusion or omission of 90 speciﬁc items. The 90 items include
speciﬁc disclosures in the following seven categories: general information
(eight items), income statement (11 items), balance sheet (14 items), funds
ﬂow statement (ﬁve items), accounting policy disclosure (20 items),
shareholders’ information (20 items), and other supplementary
information (12 items). Each country is given a score ranging from
0 to 90, with higher scores indicating greater disclosure
SMDEV Stock market development as measured by stock market capitalization
divided by GDP with data obtained from Beck et al. (2000)
AUDRISK The litigation index reported in Wingate (1997) and proxy for legal
liability of audit ﬁrms in each country and measures the level of
litigiousness in a country. The rating is developed by an international
insurance underwriter for one of the Big-5 audit ﬁrms. The variable
ranges from one to 10 and represents the “risk of doing business as an
auditor” in a particular country, with higher score indicating higher
level of litigiousness
OWNCON Average ownership percentage of the three largest shareholders of the
10 largest domestic ﬁrms, as reported by La Porta et al. (1997)
ANACOV The extent of analyst coverage in each country, as reported by
Kini et al. (2003)
Model 1
LFEE ¼ b0 þ b1SIZEþ b2INVRECþ b3OPINþ b4LOSSþ b5LEV
þ b6QUICKþ b7ROAþ b8FOREIGNþ b9DISCOP
þ b10CROSSþ b11UTILITYþ b12TENUREþ b13BIG
þ b14LCIFARþ b15SMDEVþ b16AUDRISK
þ b17OWNCONþ b18ANACOVþ b19POSTþ e1
Model 2
AQ ¼ b0 þ b1SIZEþ b2OPINþ b3LOSSþ b4LEVþ b5ROA
þ b6FOREIGNþ b7DISCOPþ b8CROSSþ b9UTILITY
þ b10BIGþ b11TENUREþ b12LFEEþ b13rREV þ b14rCFO
þ b15LCIFARþ b16SMDEVþ b17AUDRISKþ b18OWNCON
þ b19ANACOVþ b20POSTþ b21AAþ b22AA  POSTþ e3
Model 3
AAF ¼ a0 þ a1MEASUREþ a2AAþ a3MEASURE*AAþ e
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